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THE REGULATION OF THE POSSESSION OF WEAPONS AT GATHERINGS 
 
P du Toit 
G Ferreira 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The Constitution guarantees everyone the right, peacefully and unarmed, to 
assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions.1 Public demonstrations 
in South Africa are, however, often accompanied by the wielding of an array of 
weapons by those taking part therein. These demonstrations often occur in the 
context of labour disputes.2 In this note the lawfulness of the possession of weapons 
at public gatherings is considered. Particular attention will be given to the impact of 
the provisions of the Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013, which was recently signed 
into law. The Act provides for certain prohibitions and restrictions in respect of the 
possession of a dangerous weapon and it repeals the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 
1968 as well as the different Dangerous Weapons Acts in operation in the erstwhile 
TBVC States. The Act also amends the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 to 
prohibit the possession of any dangerous weapon at a gathering or demonstration. 
The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 regulates the holding of gatherings 
and demonstrations at certain places.3 
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1  Section 17 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2  See for instance Amnesty International Date Unknown www.amnesty.org. 
3  A "demonstration" is defined by the Act as "including any demonstration by one or more 
persons, but not more than 15 persons, for or against any person, cause, action or failure to 
take action". A "gathering" means any assembly, concourse or procession of more than 15 
persons in or on any public road as defined in the Road Traffic Act 1998 (Act 29 of 1998), or any 
other public place or premises wholly or partly open to the air - (a) at which the principles, 
policy, actions or failure to act of any government, political party or political organization, 
whether or not that party or organization is  registered in terms of any applicable law, are 
discussed, attacked, criticized, promoted or propagated; or (b) held to form pressure groups, to 
hand over the petitions to any person, or to mobilize or demonstrate support for or opposition to 
the views, principles, policy, actions or omissions of any person or body of persons or institution, 
including any government, administration or governmental institution." See s 1 Regulation of 
Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
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2 Prohibition on the possession of dangerous weapons in terms of the 
Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 
 
For the sake of the proper contextualisation of the issue the relevant provisions of 
the now repealed Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 will be considered as the 
point of departure. It provided for certain restrictions in respect of the possession of 
dangerous weapons. Section 2(1) of the Act read as follows: 
 
Any person who is in possession of any dangerous weapon, or of any object 
which so resembles a firearm that, under circumstances such as those under 
which such person is in possession thereof, it is likely to be mistaken for a 
real firearm, shall be guilty of an offence, unless he is able to prove that he 
at no time had any intention of using such weapon or object for any 
unlawful purpose, and shall on conviction be liable to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years. 
 
A "dangerous weapon" was defined as "any object, other than a firearm, which is 
likely to cause serious bodily injury if it were used to commit an assault".4 
 
In S v Adams5 it was pointed out that the definition of “dangerous weapon” has 
caused much difficulty in the interpretation and practical application of the 1968 
Act.6 The court pointed out that Parliament had been concerned to strike at the 
source of the unlawful use of weapons, which was endemic in some parts of the 
country, by extending the definition of a dangerous weapon, and introducing higher 
penalties for the unlawful possession thereof. The court held that the legislature did 
not want to cast the net so wide by making it prima facie an offence to be in 
possession of any object whatsoever which was likely to cause serious bodily injury if 
it were used to commit an assault.7 Nicholas AJA (Botha JA and Galgut AJA 
concurring) approached the construction of section 2(1) of the Act from the starting 
point of the ingredients of the offence which it had created. These ingredients were 
(a) possession of a (b) weapon which is (c) dangerous.8 The court held that in its 
                                                 
4  Section 1 Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968. 
5  S v Adams 1986 4 SA 882 (A). 
6  S v Adams 1986 4 SA 882 (A) 890B-C, 894C-D. 
7  S v Adams 1986 4 SA 882 (A) 895D-E. 
8  S v Adams 1986 4 SA 882 (A) 896D. 
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ordinary meaning the word "weapon" covered any object which was designed for 
use as a weapon, for example swords, daggers, bayonets and battle axes, and also 
any object which, although not designed for use as a weapon, was used or intended 
to be used as a weapon.9 In the case under section 2(1), which penalised mere 
possession, what had to be considered was whether the object was possessed qua 
weapon, or for some other reason. That was something that was normally to be 
inferred from the nature of the object and the circumstances in which it was 
possessed.10 As such the inference could for instance not be drawn that a man going 
about his daily affairs and carrying a tool to work, or a cricketer carrying his bat, was 
in possession of such a weapon. On the other hand, the court held, such an 
inference could be drawn in the case of a man carrying a cane knife during a public 
disturbance, or a man carrying a sharp chisel concealed in a shebeen.11 The state 
had to prove that the individual charged had been in possession of a weapon. That 
having been proved, the next step was to determine whether or not it was indeed a 
dangerous weapon.12 In S v Leo13 it was held that it was clear that the definition of 
"dangerous weapon" was not aimed at weapons in general, but at objects that 
fulfilled two criteria, namely (i) they must have been likely to cause serious bodily 
injury, and (ii) they must have been capable of being used in an assault. It was 
therefore necessary to consider both the nature and the qualities of the object, as 
well as its potential for use in an assault.14 
 
Section 2(1) of the 1968 Act clearly placed the burden on the accused to prove that 
he or she at no time had any intention of using the weapon or object for any 
unlawful purpose once it was established by the state that he or she had been in 
possession of a dangerous weapon or any object which so resembles a firearm that 
it is likely to be mistaken for the real firearm. Snyman15 held the view that the onus 
which the Act had placed on the accused was inconsistent with the right to be 
                                                 
9  S v Adams 1986 4 SA 882 (A) 896H-I. 
10  S v Adams 1986 4 SA 882 (A) 896J-897A. 
11  S v Adams 1986 4 SA 882 (A) 897B. 
12  S v Adams 1986 4 SA 882 (A) 897C. 
13  S v Leo 2008 2 SACR 198 (C). 
14  S v Leo 2008 2 SACR 198 (C) paras [13], [14]. 
15  Snyman Criminal Law 414. 
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presumed innocent and to remain silent, and therefore unconstitutional. He based 
his argument on analogous cases dealing with presumptions in other legislation. 
 
3 The Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013 
 
The Dangerous Weapons Act of 2013 brings about substantial changes to the law 
regarding the possession of dangerous weapons. The Act repeals the Dangerous 
Weapons Act 71 of 1968 and similar pieces of dangerous weapons legislation in 
operation in the areas of the erstwhile Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. 
This became necessary as a result of the judgement of the Constitutional Court in S 
v Thunzi and Mlonzi16 where the court called into question the constitutionality of the 
existence of multiple Dangerous Weapons Acts that operated in different parts of 
South Africa. The court held that Parliament had not established a uniform system of 
law governing the use of dangerous weapons throughout South Africa. Instead, it 
had retained the former TBVC states' laws and amended them to replicate the terms 
of the 1968 Dangerous Weapons Act in operation in South Africa.17 
 
The Constitutional Court also called into question if there was a constitutional 
obligation on Parliament to establish uniform legislation on the use of dangerous 
weapons in the Republic.18 Since the matter was not properly argued before the 
court, it inter alia called for further submissions on whether or not the existence of 
the different Dangerous Weapons Acts in operation in the former TBVC states was 
constitutionally acceptable. The court required the Speaker of the National 
Assembly, the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces and the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development to notify the court of steps that had been 
taken in fulfilment of the undertaking to rationalise the Dangerous Weapons Acts of 
the erstwhile South Africa and the TBVC states.19 In the subsequent hearing, 
Parliament accepted that it had an obligation to effect rationalisation in order to 
have uniform national legislation regulating the use of dangerous weapons. The 
                                                 
16  S v Thunzi and Mlonzi CCT 81/09 [2010] ZACC 12. 
17  S v Thunzi and Mlonzi CCT 81/09 [2010] ZACC 12 para [65]. 
18  S v Thunzi and Mlonzi CCT 81/09 [2010] ZACC 12 para [66]. 
19  S v Thunzi and Mlonzi CCT 81/09 [2010] ZACC 12 para [72]. 
P DU TOIT AND G FERREIRA                                                PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
355 / 487 
Minister also indicated that the process of rationalisation had begun.20 The 
Dangerous Weapons Act of 2013 therefore addresses the need for this uniform 
legislation that will apply throughout South Africa. 
 
In the memorandum on the objects of the Bill preceding the Act, a further object is 
stated, namely that a large number of murders and robberies, as well as other 
violent crimes, are being committed annually with dangerous weapons such as 
knives. Imitation firearms have also been found amongst robbery suspects. The Act 
therefore aims to curb these social evils.21 The Preamble of the Act refers to the 
constitutional right to the security of persons and the right to be free from all forms 
of violence as well as the right to peaceful assemblies and demonstrations. 
 
The Act prohibits the possession of any dangerous weapon under circumstances 
which may raise a reasonable suspicion that the person intends to use the 
dangerous weapon for an unlawful purpose. On conviction the offender faces a fine 
or imprisonment not exceeding three years.22 For purposes of the Act "dangerous 
weapon" means "any object, other than a firearm, designed as a weapon and 
capable of producing death or serious bodily harm, if it were used for an unlawful 
purpose".23 
 
In determining whether a person intends to use the object as a dangerous weapon 
for an unlawful purpose, the Act provides that all relevant factors must be taken into 
account. These factors include but are not limited to (a) the place and time where 
the person is found; (b) the behaviour of the person, including the making of any 
threat or the display of intimidatory behaviour; (c) the manner in which the object is 
carried or displayed; (d) whether the possession of the object was in the context of 
drug dealing, gang association or any organised crime activity or (e) any other 
relevant factors, including any explanation the person may wish to provide for his or 
her possession of the object. The last of these factors may, however, not be 
                                                 
20  S v Thunzi and Mlonzi CCT 81/09 [2010] ZACC 27 para [8]. 
21  Memorandum on the Objects of the Dangerous Weapons Bill, 2012 (GN 606 in GG 34579 of 2 
September 2011). 
22  Section 3(1) Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. 
23  Section 1 Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013.  
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interpreted as an obligation on the person to explain his or her possession of the 
object.24 
 
The Act, however, does not apply to the following activities: the possession of 
dangerous weapons in pursuit of any lawful employment, duty or activity;25 the 
possession of dangerous weapons during the participation in any religious or cultural 
activities, or lawful sport, recreation, or entertainment;26 or the legitimate collection, 
display or exhibition of weapons.27 
 
The Dangerous Weapons Act also amends section 8(4) of the Regulation of 
Gatherings Act to provide that no participant at a gathering or demonstration may 
have in his or her possession (a) any airgun, firearm, imitation firearm or any 
muzzle-loading firearm, as defined in section 1 of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 
2000, or any object which resembles a firearm and that is likely to be mistaken for a 
firearm or (b) any dangerous weapon, as defined in the Act. The convenor and 
marshals appointed in terms of the Gatherings Act must take all reasonable steps to 
ensure that section 8(4) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act is complied with.28 
 
4 Discussion 
 
4.1 The meaning of "possession of dangerous weapons" 
 
The first question which arises is if a "dangerous weapon" as defined by the 
Dangerous Weapons Act of 2013 includes an object which, although not designed 
for use as a weapon, is used or intended to be used as a weapon. This approach 
was followed by the court in Adams in the interpretation of the meaning of 
"dangerous weapon" in the Dangerous Weapons Act of 1968.29 In an early version of 
the Bill preceding the Act a "dangerous weapon" was defined as “any object, other 
                                                 
24  Section 3(2) Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. 
25  Section 2(a) Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. 
26  Section 2(b) Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. 
27  Section 2(c) Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. 
28  Section 5(a) Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. 
29  See 3 above. 
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than a firearm, designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or serious 
bodily harm”30. The Act, however, simply states that the object must be capable of 
causing death or inflicting serious bodily harm, if it were used for an unlawful 
purpose.31 In S v Rabako32 Musi J (Milton AJ concurring) interpreted “grievous bodily 
harm” in the context of sentencing in a rape case. They held that “grievous” means 
nothing more than “really serious”. The court held that, if the injury inflicted by the 
accused on the body of the rape survivor is serious, then it involves the infliction of 
grievous bodily harm. A serious injury need not necessarily be an injury that is 
permanent, life-threatening, dangerous or disabling. Whether the injuries were life-
threatening, necessitated hospitalisation or immediate medical attention will 
generally be relevant to determining the degree of seriousness, but not necessarily 
the seriousness itself. Whether an injury is deemed to be serious or not will depend 
on the facts and circumstances of every case. The injury should, however, not be 
trivial or insignificant. 
 
The drafters of the Act also clearly took cognisance of the interpretation by our 
courts of the Dangerous Weapons Act of 1968. To ensure that the net of criminal 
liability is not cast on those who possess the weapon for a lawful purpose, it was 
held in Adams that a weapon included any object which, although not designed for 
use as a weapon, was used or intended to be used as a weapon. The 2013 Act 
prohibits the possession of a weapon under circumstances which may raise a 
reasonable suspicion that the person intends to use the dangerous weapon for an 
unlawful purpose.33 This section embodies the actus reus of the offence that the 
state must prove, which includes the objective criterion “under circumstances which 
may give rise to a reasonable suspicion”. Furthermore, as was pointed out above, it 
was held in Adams that in order to determine whether or not the accused intended 
to possess the weapon as a weapon, the court had to consider the nature of the 
object and the circumstances in which it was possessed. The 2013 Act gives detailed 
guidance as to the factors that a court may consider in determining whether the 
                                                 
30  Clause 1 Dangerous Weapons Bill [B37-2012]. 
31  S 1 Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. 
32  S v Rabako 2010 1 SACR 310 (O) para [7]. 
33  Section 3(1) Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. 
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accused intended to use the weapon for an unlawful purpose.34 Although these 
factors may guide the court to establish the intention of the person by inferential 
reasoning, the onus remains on the state to prove the required intention. 
 
The Act does not define the meaning of "possession". The ordinary meaning of the 
word requires that the individual must exercise physical control or custody over the 
object (detentio) and have the necessary intent (animus) to exercise such control.35 
 
4.2 The onus on the state 
 
One of the positive features of the Act is that it no longer places a burden of proof 
on the accused. In terms of the Dangerous Weapons Act of 1968, once the state 
proved that the person had been in possession of a dangerous weapon, the accused 
person had to prove that at no time had he any intention of using the weapon for 
any unlawful purpose.36 In terms of the 2013 Act the state will not only have to 
prove that the accused person was in possession of the prohibited weapon but also 
that it was possessed under circumstances which may raise a reasonable suspicion 
that the person intended to use the prohibited object for an unlawful purpose. 
Whether the suspicion can be regarded as reasonable or not must be approached in 
an objective manner. The circumstances giving rise to the suspicion must be such as 
would ordinarily move a reasonable person to form the suspicion that the person 
intended to use the prohibited object for an unlawful purpose.37 
 
4.3 Prohibition on possession of weapons at a gathering or 
demonstration 
 
The 2013 Act amends the Regulation of Gatherings Act to prohibit the possession of 
any dangerous weapon at a gathering or demonstration.38 The Act also prohibits the 
                                                 
34  Section 3(2) Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. See the factors listed in 4 above. 
35  Snyman Criminal Law 412. See also S v Mosoinyane 1998 1 SACR 583 (T) 591E-593G. 
36  Section 2(1) Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968. 
37  Du Toit et al Commentary 5-11. 
38  Section 5(a) Dangerous Weapons Act 15 of 2013. An early version of the Bill [B37-2012] 
preceding the Act prohibited not only the possession of a dangerous weapon at a gathering or 
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possession at a gathering or demonstration of any airgun, firearm, imitation firearm 
or any muzzle-loading firearm, as defined in the Firearms Control Act, or any object 
which resembles a firearm and that is likely to be mistaken for a firearm. A person 
possessing a firearm with a licence or permit as required by the Firearms Control Act 
would therefore also be guilty of an offence if he or she possesses the firearm at a 
gathering or demonstration. The inclusion of an airgun, imitation firearm and 
muzzle-loading firearm are necessary because these objects are not regarded as 
firearms for purposes of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, which provides for the 
system of firearms control.39 The Firearms Control Act does, however, create a 
number of different offences in respect of these objects. Any person who fails to 
comply with these provisions is guilty of an offence and on conviction liable to a fine 
not exceeding R20 000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to 
both such fine and such imprisonment.40 
 
The offence created by section 3(1) of the Act (the possession of a dangerous 
weapon which may raise a reasonable suspicion that the person intends to use the 
dangerous weapon for an unlawful purpose) must not be confused with the offence 
created by section 5(a) thereof amending the Regulation of Gatherings Act 
(possession at a gathering or demonstration of any dangerous weapon as defined by 
the Dangerous Weapons Act). The definition of a dangerous weapon in the Act does 
not include the requirement that there must be a reasonable suspicion that the 
person intended to use the dangerous weapon for an unlawful purpose. The 
possession of the weapon at a gathering or demonstration is therefore prohibited if 
the object is capable of causing death or inflicting serious bodily harm if it were used 
for an unlawful purpose. It does not require a reasonable suspicion that the person 
intends to use it for an unlawful purpose. According to media reports the Acting 
Minister in the Presidency for Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, Richard 
                                                                                                                                                        
demonstration, but also "any other object that is likely to cause injury to a person or damage to 
property". 
39  Section 1 read with ss 5(1)(e) and (f) Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000. 
40  Section 12(1)(c) Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. 
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Baloyi, stated that the Act would make the carrying of weapons by protestors 
"completely illegal".41 
 
4.4 Exceptions to the application of the Act 
 
In 1992 the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public 
Violence and Intimidation appointed an international panel of experts to advise one 
of its committees on the most desirable rules and procedures pertaining to mass 
demonstrations, marches and picketing. In its report42 the panel recommended "a 
universal prohibition on demonstrators carrying weapons or replicas of weapons or 
wearing disguises". The South African Constitution in section 17 echoes the same 
sentiment by providing that "everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to 
assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions". By recognising 
assemblies, demonstrations, picketing and the presenting of petitions as a right of 
everyone, the Constitution acknowledges it as an important form of political 
engagement and as an essential phenomenon in any liberal democracy.43 
 
The recommendation by the panel of experts does not make any reference to the 
kind of weapons that are prohibited or suggest any exceptions to the said 
prohibition, notwithstanding the fact that the carrying of so-called cultural weapons 
is a fairly wide-spread phenomenon in South Africa, for example the stick 
(knobkierie), assegai (spear) and shield carried by Zulu men during certain 
ceremonies. The Constitution follows a similar approach. It does not define the 
nature of the terms assembly, demonstration and picketing contained in section 17, 
nor does it make provision for any exceptions to the ban on the carrying of weapons 
during these events. However, the Dangerous Weapons Act in section 2 determines 
that the Act does not apply to the following activities: (a) possession of dangerous 
weapons in pursuit of any lawful employment, duty or activity; (b) possession of 
dangerous weapons during the participation in any religious or cultural activities or 
                                                 
41  All Africa South Africa 2012 allafrica.com. 
42  Heymann (ed) Towards Peaceful Protest 17. 
43  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 396. 
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lawful sport, recreation or entertainment or (c) legitimate collection, display or 
exhibition of weapons. 
 
This provision raises a number of issues. Section 17 of the Constitution requires 
assemblies, demonstrations, picketing and the presenting of petitions to be 
unarmed. Unarmed in this sense, it is submitted, should be taken not only to refer to 
firearms, but also to dangerous weapons other than firearms. The Act does not 
provide definitions for religious or cultural activities mentioned in section 2 and one 
can argue that these activities may form part of assemblies, demonstrations, and the 
presentation of petitions referred to in section 17 of the Constitution. Therefore, 
section 2 of the Act should not be interpreted to authorise, in conflict with section 17 
of the Constitution, the carrying of dangerous weapons during religious and cultural 
activities. It merely states that the Act is not applicable to the specified events. On 
the other hand one must keep in mind that the Constitution in sections 30 and 31 
grants the right to religious and cultural expression and that a strong argument can 
be made in favour of the carrying of certain weapons as a form of religious or 
cultural expression. In this regard it is suggested that a generally acceptable 
objective definition of terms such as "religious and cultural activities" and "religious 
and cultural weapons" would be impossible to frame due to the subjective nature 
thereof. Section 31 states that persons belonging to a cultural or religious 
community may not be denied the right to enjoy their culture or practise their 
religion with other members of such a community, and that these rights may not be 
exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. Section 30 
explicitly reiterates that everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of 
their choice, but that no one may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision 
in the Bill of Rights. At the same time the provisions of section 12(1)(c) of the 
Constitution must also be given practical effect, namely that everyone has the right 
to freedom and security of the person, including to be free from all forms of violence 
from either public or private sources. A weighing up of different fundamental rights 
is thus required, such as the right to religious and cultural expression (which may 
involve the carrying of weapons and which may have in certain instances the 
P DU TOIT AND G FERREIRA                                                PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
362 / 487 
potential to erupt into violence) against the right to be free from all forms of 
violence. 
 
Although the Constitution does not define the concepts of assembly, demonstration, 
and picketing in section 17, it would seem that the essence of these terms is to be 
found in their "protesting" or "confrontational" nature. In this regard one must also 
refer to section 1 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993, according to 
which the definitions of the terms "demonstration" and "gathering" clearly display a " 
“protesting" or "confrontational" nature. It is probably this fact that has led the 
drafters of the Constitution to require any assembly, demonstration, picketing or 
presenting of a petition in terms of section 17 to take place "peacefully and 
unarmed" so as to avoid violent conflict in which weapons are used. It is important 
to note that certain cultural and religious events may also be "protesting" or 
"confrontational" in nature (with the concomitant risk of turning violent) and one 
could argue that these events should therefore probably have been included in the 
prohibition on the possession of dangerous weapons in section 3 of the Dangerous 
Weapons Act. However, the fact that section 2 exempts religious or cultural activities 
(and does not use the words religious and cultural gatherings and demonstrations as 
in section 4 of an early version of the Bill preceding the Act),44 creates the 
impression that the drafters of the Act had in mind religious and cultural events that 
are not "protesting" or "confrontational" in nature, and therefore did not include 
such events in section 3 of the Act, which prohibits the possession of dangerous 
weapons. In the said previous version of the Act, section 4 explicitly made provision 
for authorisation to carry dangerous weapons "during a gathering or demonstration, 
for cultural or religious purposes or historical enactments". The Act excludes 
religious and cultural activities from the application of the Act, but is silent on the 
position of historical enactments. It can, however, be argued that section 2 is 
formulated broadly enough to include historical enactments. In a similar vein it is 
suggested that historical enactments, as well as lawful employment activities, sport, 
recreation and entertainment and the legitimate collection, display or exhibition of 
weapons in terms of section 2 of the Act, would not be in violation of section 17 of 
                                                 
44  Clause 4 Dangerous Weapons Bill [B37-2012]. 
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the Constitution as these kinds of events are normally not "protesting" or 
"confrontational" in nature, at least not in the sense of running a serious risk of 
turning into a violent protest or confrontation in which dangerous weapons are used 
to injure or even kill people. In addition, the events excluded in section 2 would 
normally be relatively easily identifiable as such and thus need not be defined in the 
Act. Any attempt to exhaustively describe these concepts would probably create 
greater legal uncertainty than legal clarification. 
 
It must be pointed out that the discretion to determine whether or not a person 
intends to use a dangerous weapon for an unlawful purpose contained in section 3 
of the Act is fully in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court in Dawood v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) where it was explicitly found that the 
legislative granting of a discretion must be accompanied by the jurisdictional facts to 
be taken into account when the discretion is exercised. Although this case dealt with 
the limitation of a fundamental right by way of discretion, it is suggested that the 
following finding of the Court is valid also in the current context:45 
 
It is an important principle of the rule of law that rules be stated in a clear 
and accessible manner. ... [I]f broad discretionary powers contain no 
express constraints, those who are affected by the exercise of the broad 
discretionary powers, will not know what is relevant to the exercise of those 
powers or in what circumstances they are entitled to seek relief from an 
adverse decision. 
 
Section 3 lists the factors to be taken into account when exercising the said 
discretion as including the time and place where the person is found, the behaviour 
of the person, the manner in which the person carries or displays the weapon and 
the question of whether or not the possession of the weapon relates to criminal 
activity. 
 
                                                 
45  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 47. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
The Dangerous Weapons Act of 2013 addresses two important constitutional 
concerns. It provides for a uniform system of law governing the use of dangerous 
weapons for the whole of South Africa and it furthermore no longer places the onus 
on the individual charged with the offence of the possession of a dangerous weapon 
that he or she did not have any intention of using the firearm for an unlawful 
purpose. 
 
The Act also defines the meaning of a dangerous weapon. According to our court's 
interpretation of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 a dangerous weapon is 
regarded as an object used or intended to be used as a weapon even if it had not 
been designed for use as a weapon. However, the Act requires the object to be 
capable of causing death or inflicting serious bodily harm if it were used for an 
unlawful purpose. The possession of a dangerous weapon under circumstances 
which may raise a reasonable suspicion that the person intends to use it for an 
unlawful purpose attracts criminal liability. The Act also provides a useful set of 
guidelines to assist courts to determine if a person charged with the offence of the 
possession of a dangerous weapon had indeed intended to use the weapon for an 
unlawful purpose. It seems, however, that the Act prohibits the possession of a 
dangerous weapon at gatherings even if the person carrying the weapon does not 
intend to use it for an unlawful purpose. The state will, however, have to prove that 
the accused had the necessary control over the object and the intention to exercise 
such control, as well as that the object is capable of causing death and inflicting 
serious bodily harm if it were used for an unlawful purpose. 
 
It is suggested that the exclusions contained in section 2 of the Act are acceptable if 
the religious and cultural events referred to in that section are not of a "protesting" 
or "confrontational" nature. If such events are indeed "protesting" or 
"confrontational" in nature, they are covered by section 17 of the Constitution 
(which authorises only peaceful and unarmed assembly, demonstration, picketing 
and presenting of petitions). The possession of dangerous weapons at religious and 
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cultural events which display a "protesting" or "confrontational" character runs a 
serious risk of turning violent, and may result in a violation of section 12(1)(c) of the 
Constitution, which embodies the right of everyone to be free from all forms of 
violence. 
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